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CASE COMMENTS
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LAW,
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PROBLEMS:
JONES, GPS TRACKING, AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
Lauren Millcarek
In 2004, law enforcement officers began investigating Antoine
Jones, a Washington, D.C. nightclub owner, for suspected drug
trafficking.1 After gathering information through stakeouts, cameras,
and a wiretap on Jones’ phone, the officers obtained a warrant to place a
Global Positioning System (GPS) tracker on Jones’ wife’s car, which
Jones possessed and used regularly.2 However, the officers failed to
comply with the precise terms of the warrant,3 making the installation
and use of the tracker warrantless. The officers tracked the car’s every
movement, twenty-four hours per day, for an entire month.4 The data
linked Jones to a stash house containing a great deal of cash and
cocaine.5
Based partially on this evidence, the Government charged Jones in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia with conspiracy to
distribute and possess cocaine.6 Jones moved to suppress the GPS
tracking evidence.7 The trial court granted Jones’ motion in part: it
suppressed the tracking evidence obtained while the car was parked at
his house, but it admitted the evidence obtained while he was driving.8
 J.D. 2012, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. 2009, University of
Florida. I thank the members and staff of the Florida Law Review, with whom it was a pleasure
and privilege to have worked for the past two years. I am truly honored to have a piece
published in this distinguished journal.
1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
2. Id. The Court briefly determined that there was no standing issue regarding Jones’
status as only a user and not the owner of the car. Id. at 949 n.2.
3. Id. at 948. The warrant allowed for the tracker to be placed on the car in D.C. and
within ten days of the warrant’s issue. However, the officers placed the tracker in Maryland and
on the eleventh day. Id. The Government conceded that the officers did not comply with the
warrant. Id. at 948 n.1.
4. Id. at 948. The tracker produced 2,000 pages of data over the course of twenty-eight
days. Id.
5. Id. at 948–49. By “great deal,” I mean more than three-quarters of a million dollars in
cash and nearly 100 kilograms of cocaine. Id.
6. Id. at 948.
7. Id.
8. Id. This split ruling was based on the law created by the beeper tracker cases, which
held that tracking an item’s movements on public roads was not a search, but tracking an item
into the privacy of a home was a search. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281, 285
1101
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The trial resulted in a hung jury, but when Jones was indicted again on
the same charges, he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.9
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the conviction, reasoning that the warrantless search violated
the Fourth Amendment.10 The circuit court denied an en banc rehearing,
and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.11 The issue in the case
was whether the installation of the GPS device on the car and the use of
the device to monitor the car for a month was a “search” within the
ambit of the Fourth Amendment.12 The unanimous13 Court answered
that question in the affirmative, holding that the attachment coupled
with the use of the GPS device was a “search.”14 The Court did not,
however, answer the larger question as to whether the use, by itself, of
GPS trackers was constitutionally permissible; but the concurring
opinions point to where the Court may soon end up on that issue.15
To answer the very narrow question on which it actually based its
decision, the Court resorted to some very old jurisprudence: trespass
doctrine. This doctrine was first created in the 1928 case of Olmstead v.
United States,16 in which the defendants violated Prohibition by
conspiring to “import, possess and sell” alcohol.17 Federal officers
warrantlessly wiretapped the defendants’ telephones from outside their
houses, without physically trespassing onto the defendants’ property;
the conversations intercepted by the wiretaps led to the defendants’
arrests.18 The Court held that because there was no trespass—that is, no
“actual physical invasion” of the defendants’ property—there was no
Fourth Amendment search.19
This doctrine persisted for nearly forty years, until Olmstead was
overruled by Katz v. United States.20 In Katz, the defendant was

(1983); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715–18 (1984). For a fuller discussion of Knotts,
see infra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
9. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49.
10. Id. at 949.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 948.
13. The decision was unanimous, but there were three separate opinions: a five-Justice
majority opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, a concurrence written by Justice Sonia
Sotomayor (who also joined the majority), and a concurrence in judgment written by Justice
Samuel A. Alito and joined by the three other Justices in the minority. See infra notes 41, 53,
68.
14. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
15. See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. Id. at 455.
18. Id. at 456–57.
19. Id. at 466.
20. 389 U.S. at 347.
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convicted of placing interstate telephone bets.21 He made the bets from
a public phone booth, without knowing that federal agents had attached
an electronic listening device to the outside of the booth, without
physically entering into it.22 The appellate court affirmed the
defendant’s conviction on the basis of Olmstead because no physical
trespass had occurred.23 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
because the defendant sought to preserve the privacy of his conversation
by entering and closing the door of the phone booth,24 rather than
“knowingly expos[ing the conversation] to the public,”25 the
conversation was protected and a Fourth Amendment search occurred
when the agents intercepted it.26 The Court emphasized that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,”27 and so “[t]he fact that the
electronic device employed to achieve [the interception of the private
conversation] did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have
no constitutional significance.”28 Therefore, the Court overruled
Olmstead and stated that “the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion,”29 apparently
laying the trespass doctrine to rest.
The concurrence by Justice John Marshall Harlan II formed the real
takeaway30 from Katz.31 He set forth a two-pronged test for determining
when a Fourth Amendment search occurs, which came to be the
prevailing standard: first, the defendant must have “an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy,” and second, that expectation must
“be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”32 Because
the defendant in Katz clearly expected his conversation to be private (as
21. Id. at 348.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 348–49.
24. Id. at 352.
25. Id. at 351.
26. Id. at 359.
27. Id. at 351. The argument between the Government and the defendant in Katz was
actually focused on another issue: whether the phone booth was a constitutionally protected
area. Id. Because the Court decided that it was the private conversation conveyed by the person
that was protected, not the space itself, that question was never answered. Ironically, the
reinvigoration of trespass doctrine by the Court in the instant case has again raised the (as-yet
unanswered) question of whether a phone booth is considered a constitutionally protected place.
28. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
29. Id.
30. It is worth noting that Justice Harlan read the Katz majority opinion to hold “that
electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place” may be a search. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added). While many may have believed that the overruling of Olmstead
and the language of the majority opinion in Katz closed the book on the trespass doctrine,
Justice Harlan’s language suggests otherwise and, in that sense, left the page marked, allowing
the doctrine to be later revitalized.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 361.
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he shut the door to the phone booth), and society would generally agree
that a phone booth “is a temporarily private place whose momentary
occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as
reasonable,” a search had occurred.33
United States v. Knotts34 clarified the Katz test as it applied to the
use of electronic tracking devices. In Knotts, police placed a beeper
tracker35 into a tub of chloroform that was then sold to the defendant;
the tracker was placed in the tub before purchase with the seller’s
consent.36 The police tracked the tub (and its accompanying vehicle)
over public roadways to the defendant’s cabin, where he was running a
meth lab.37 The Court held that “[a] person travelling in an automobile
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.”38 The movements of the tub and
the vehicle were visible to anyone and “voluntarily conveyed” to the
public;39 so, the Court reasoned, the tracking of these movements did
not violate any “legitimate expectation of privacy” and did not
constitute a search under Katz.40
Coming into the instant case, it appeared as if the Katz “reasonable
expectation of privacy” formulation would decide the issue of whether
the installation and use of the GPS tracker was a search; after Knotts, it
seemed that tracking a vehicle in public places was reasonable and
constitutionally permissible. However, the Jones Court, in a majority
opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia,41 looked much further back
than Katz: all the way back to the meaning of the Fourth Amendment at
the time of its adoption.42 According to this original meaning, a search
was only a “search” if it involved physical trespass onto the defendant’s
33. Id.
34. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
35. A beeper tracker “is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic
signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.” Id. at 277. Essentially, beeper trackers are the
technological forerunners of GPS trackers.
36. Id. at 278.
37. Id. at 278–79.
38. Id. at 281.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 285. In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715–18 (1984), the other major
beeper tracker case, the Court held that tracking an item into the privacy of the home constituted
a search. See supra note 8 for a joint statement of the holdings of Knotts and Karo. The Jones
Court dismissed the Government’s reliance on both Knotts and Karo (which together suggested
that the use of a tracker to track a vehicle in public was permissible) because the trackers in
those cases were installed on the items before they came into the defendants’ possession, unlike
in Jones. See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
41. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Sonia Sotomayor, the latter of whom also wrote a lengthy
concurrence. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 947 (2012).
42. Id. at 949.
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property43—the logic posited by the overruled Olmstead. The Court
noted the Katz test’s deviation from the traditional trespass-based
jurisprudence, but contended that “Katz did not repudiate” the trespass
test;44 instead, it argued, the Katz “test has been added to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”45 The Court held that
there must either be a physical trespass or a violation of a reasonable
expectation of privacy in order for there to be a Fourth Amendment
“search.”46
The Court then explained the distinction that allowed its holding
without overturning Knotts: in Knotts, the tracker was installed before
the object came into the defendant’s possession, whereas the opposite
was true in the instant case.47 This, according to the Court, placed the
defendant “on much different footing”48 than in previous electronic
tracking cases. Because the installation of the tracker was a physical
trespass that occurred during the defendant’s possession of the vehicle,
there was a “search.”
The Court put two important limitations on this old (but actually
new) trespass test. First, a simple trespass alone is not enough—the
trespass must be done for the purpose of obtaining information.49 The
Court also noted that the trespass must be onto a protected area
enumerated by the Fourth Amendment—that is, persons, houses,
papers, or effects.50 Because in this case there was (1) a physical
trespass (2) during the defendant’s possession (3) onto a constitutionally
protected area (the car51) (4) for the purpose of gathering information,
there was a “search.” Thus, the Court affirmed the appellate court and
reversed Jones’ conviction.52
43. Id.
44. Id. at 950.
45. Id. at 952.
46. Id. at 950.
47. Id. at 951–52.
48. Id. at 952.
49. Id. at 951 n.5. For instance, if a policeman simply fell over onto a person’s property
by accident, that would not constitute a “search,” though it may technically be a “trespass.”
50. Id. at 953; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This limitation preserves the Court’s open fields
doctrine, which was created by Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), and provides that
law enforcement officers’ entrance for investigative purposes onto the open fields of one’s
property, even though it may be a technical trespass, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
“search” because the fields surrounding one’s property are not part of the constitutionally
protected area of the “house.”
51. A car is an “effect” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (citing
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977), abrogated in part on other grounds by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991)).
52. Id. at 954. The Court did not delve further into whether this particular search was
unreasonable and unconstitutional. Thus, the question of whether the police need a warrant to
install a GPS tracker remains open. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, What Jones Does Not Hold, VOLOKH
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Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred with the majority.53 She agreed
that the Katz test was meant to augment, not to replace, the trespass
test,54 concluding that the majority properly relied on the narrowest
means of decision: “When the Government physically invades personal
property to gather information, a search occurs. The reaffirmation of
that principle suffices to decide this case.”55
However, in a carefully worded understatement, Justice Sotomayor
also noted that “[i]n cases of electronic or other novel modes of
surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property,
the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance.”56
She reasoned that long-term GPS tracking interferes with expectations
of privacy on a much deeper level than the majority was willing to
recognize, rightly noting that such surveillance creates “a precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”57 Justice Sotomayor laid out some of the
incredibly private movements that such invasive surveillance would
capture and record for posterity: “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club,
the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting,
the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.” 58 Her
constitutional concern was that the public’s awareness that law
enforcement may be monitoring and recording these activities “chills
associational and expressive freedoms.”59
Justice Sotomayor offered some thoughts on how the Katz analysis
is impacted by the in-depth, precise nature of GPS tracking
technology.60 She argued that the fact that electronic surveillance
merely duplicates traditional surveillance is not dispositive as to
whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.61 Instead, she
“would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will
be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/01/23/what-jones-does-nothold/.
53. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 955.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. at 956. For a more general look at how police searches psychologically impact the
public, see Nancy Leong, The Open Road and the Traffic Stop: Narratives and CounterNarratives of the American Dream, 64 FLA. L. REV. 305, 335 (2012).
60. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 956.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss4/7

6

Millcarek: Eighteenth Century Law, Twenty-First Century Problems: Jones, GPS

2012]

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LAW, TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PROBLEMS

1107

ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual
habits, and so on.”62
The Justice also indicated her willingness to rethink the “premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”63 Here, she
reasserted a “degrees of privacy” argument first made by Justice
Thurgood Marshall in dissent more than thirty years ago in Smith v.
Maryland.64 Based on the Katz “knowingly exposed” formulation, the
Court has long held that people have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information that they “voluntarily” disclose to third
parties—including the phone numbers they dial, the Web sites they
visit, and their financial records.65 Justice Marshall dissented when the
Court created this third-party disclosure approach in Smith, arguing that
people still expect some degree of privacy in such information, despite
its voluntary disclosure to certain entities.66 Justice Sotomayor similarly
reasoned that this third-party disclosure, all-or-nothing approach “is ill
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks.”67 The notion that we can simply avoid privacy
disclosures altogether is unrealistic in modern society, so the
assumption-of-risk argument underpinning the premise of the thirdparty disclosure doctrine is fundamentally flawed. Just as one cannot
avoid information disclosures to one’s phone company, Internet service
provider, and bank, one similarly cannot avoid the disclosure of
personal details collected in the sum total of one’s movements on public
roadways. Thus, while Justice Sotomayor joined the backward-looking
majority, her concurrence demonstrates the most forward-thinking
rationale in the instant case.
Justice Samuel A. Alito, in an opinion that falls between the
majority and Justice Sotomayor on the spectrum of privacy rights,
concurred in the judgment.68 He believed that Katz foreclosed the old
trespass-based approach, and he would reinstitute the Katz test as the
exclusive test for whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred.69
Justice Alito accused the majority of using eighteenth century law to
solve a twenty-first century problem.70 While Justice Scalia posited that
62. Id.
63. Id. at 957.
64. Id. (citing 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
65. Id.
66. 442 U.S. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
68. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer,
and Elena Kagan joined Justice Alito’s opinion. Id.
69. Id. at 959–60.
70. Id. at 957.
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something analogous to twenty-four hour GPS surveillance could have
been accomplished at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption by
“a constable’s concealing himself in the target’s coach in order to track
its movements,”71 Justice Alito flippantly dismissed that hypothetical as
requiring “a very tiny constable . . . with incredible fortitude and
patience.”72
Instead of the installation of the tracker being a search, Justice Alito
argued, it is the use of the tracker that is of concern.73 He noted that
such a triviality as “attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object
that does not interfere in any way with the car’s operation” is not
actually interfering with the car owner’s possessory interest and so is
essentially meaningless under trespass law, yet would constitute a
search under the majority’s test.74 On the other hand, if “the Federal
Government required or persuaded auto manufacturers to include a GPS
tracking device in every car,” the use of such a tracker—without an
accompanying installation—would not constitute a search.75 The Justice
found this approach to be logically upside-down.
Justice Alito’s approach would apply the Katz test to the instant case
in a somewhat peculiar way, though. He believed that the four-week
tracking in the instant case definitely violated society’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, but he also posited that short-term tracking does
not do so (and failed to explain where and when the line would be
crossed).76 Because Justice Alito does not believe the installation itself
of the device was a search, the implication is that warrantless
installation and short-term tracking would not constitute a search under
his theory. The Justice also noted that even long-term tracking may be
reasonable if the crime is severe enough.77 (Presumably, he would
require something more serious than the lifetime-imprisonment drug
conspiracy in the instant case, though it is unclear what crime that
would be.) While Justice Alito disagreed with the majority’s test, he
believed that the long-term tracking in the instant case violated society’s
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Katz test and concurred
with the majority that a search occurred.78
So while the result was unanimous—a search occurred here—the
reasoning was split 5–4, with the majority reinstating the trespass test
and Justice Alito’s faction preferring the Katz test exclusively.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 950 n.3 (majority opinion).
Id. at 958 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 958.
Id. at 961.
Id.
Id. at 964.
Id.
Id.
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Undoubtedly, though, the warrantless installation together with the
long-term use of a GPS tracker is a search. Unfortunately, the Jones
case raises many more questions than this very specific one it answers.79
First, is the trespass distinction necessary? After all, the law of
trespass, in itself, is arguably a legally embodied (and therefore
reasonable) expectation of privacy. Theoretically, then, the Katz test
encompasses the trespass test and renders it unnecessary.80 This,
however, is a mostly academic train of thought and one unlikely to
make much of an impact on the Court.
More importantly, the trespass test is ambiguous in one key respect:
what is an enumerated protected area? That is, what exactly are the
contours of “persons, houses, papers, and effects”? What about the
archetypal Katz phone booth (if such a thing still exists)? And what
about other analogues: is a hotel room, for instance, a temporary
“house”? The Court gives us no guidance on this front, and Katz left
this issue very much open.81
And once one decides that installation of the device is a search of a
protected area, then one must decide if it is unreasonable and
unconstitutional. The presumption is that a warrantless search is
unreasonable.82 The warrant requirement is inextricably intertwined
here, yet the state of that law is left unsettled: the future weight of this
decision on the warrant issue hinges on whether one of the Justices
could cross camps in deciding whether warrantless installation coupled
with short-term monitoring constitutes an unreasonable search.
After all, the four-Justice concurrence in judgment already believes
that the installation of the tracker on its own is not a search at all, let
alone an unreasonable one. Just one member of the five-Justice majority
would have to decide that even if the installation is a search, the shortterm monitoring is “sufficiently minor to not require a warrant,”83
making the search reasonable. If that happens, law enforcement can
install trackers and monitor them in the short-term with carte blanche.
79. See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, Jones Confounds the Press, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25, 2012,
11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/jones-confounds-the-press/; Orin Kerr, Why
United States v. Jones Is Subject to So Many Different Interpretations, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Jan. 30, 2012, 4:59 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/01/30/why-united-states-v-jones-is-subject-toso-many-different-interpretations/.
80. This would, of course, throw the open fields doctrine into question, which is a notinsubstantial wrinkle in this navel-gazing exercise. For an explanation of the open fields
doctrine, see supra note 50.
81. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. I thank Professor John Stinneford for
pointing out this open question and for his helpful comments.
82. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). This presumption is, of course,
subject to myriad exceptions.
83. Tom Goldstein, Reactions to Jones v. United States: The Government Fared Much
Better than Everyone Realizes, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 23, 2012, 4:07 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=137698.
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And because the ideological breakdown of the Justices in Jones is crosspolitical, with several conservatives siding with the majority, it seems
quite likely that one of them will eventually be willing to switch camps
and side with the police to determine that warrantless installation with
short-term monitoring constitutes a reasonable, constitutional search.84
The warrant jurisprudence is vast and murky, and Jones offers a
glimpse at a possible near-future.
Most essentially, however, the majority punted on the real question
raised by the instant case: what do we do about the invasive, long-term
invasion of privacy created by limitless, technologically powered
government surveillance?85 Under Jones, the police can still install
trackers into your electronics before you come into possession of them
and track you theoretically ad infinitum, without consequences. The
GPS on your phone? Trackable. Your car’s built-in GPS? Trackable.
Forever. As long as you are in public, you have no reasonable
expectation of privacy over that information—so the police would not
even be doing a “search,” under either Jones or Katz. You would have
zero Fourth Amendment protection. So while Jones may seem, on its
face, like a pro-privacy decision (police, you should probably get a
warrant before you install a GPS tracker!), its implications cut very
much the other way.86
And yet, “the significance of Jones in this area of the law will fade
pretty quickly.”87 Technology is constantly getting more sophisticated
and law enforcement soon will no longer need to physically attach a
tracker to property in order to perform round-the-clock surveillance.88
84. See id. (arguing that the Government “is more likely than not to prevail in a later case
in which it installs a GPS monitor without a warrant and tracks the individual for only a couple
of days”). However, it appears that the Government is less than certain about its eventual
victory. After Jones came down, the Federal Bureau of Investigation turned off some 3,000 GPS
trackers it had in use—a move prompted, in part, by the concerns raised by the concurring
Justices. Julia Angwin, FBI Turns Off Thousands of GPS Devices After Supreme Court Ruling,
WALL ST. J. BLOGS: DIGITS (Feb. 25, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/02/25/
fbi-turns-off-thousands-of-gps-devices-after-supreme-court-ruling/.
85. See Dahlia Lithwick, Alito vs. Scalia, SLATE (Jan. 23, 2012, 6:38 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/01/u_s_v_jones_supreme_
court_justices_alito_and_scalia_brawl_over_technology_and_privacy_.2.html (noting that “[i]t
is [Justice Sotomayor] who seems best to understand that [intrusive surveillance] is the real
problem the court should be focused on, even though she refuses to address it today”).
86. See Tom Goldstein, Why Jones Is Still Less of a Pro-Privacy Decision than Most
Thought, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=138066.
87. Id.
88. Some of this technology is already in use: drones, omnipresent security cameras,
“smart dust devices” (does a tracker the size of a dust mote landing on you count as a
“trespass”?), and facial- and iris-recognition software. See John W. Whitehead, U.S. v. Jones:
The Battle for the Fourth Amendment Continues, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2012, 7:02 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/us-v-jones-surveillance-technology_b_1224
660.html.
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Thus, this will likely turn out to be an important opinion by Justice
Sotomayor, providing crucial clarifying dicta as to how to think about
Katz and privacy in a time where technology is evolving much more
rapidly than the law.89 Though she joins the majority, her pro-privacy
stance creates a five-Justice majority with Justice Alito’s anti-Big
Brother concurrence. If the right case were to come along, with no
technical trespass but nonetheless a technologically created,
unreasonable infringement on society’s privacy expectations, the
privacy advocates could win the day. So while Jones clearly is not the
last word in privacy and GPS surveillance, the unique breakdown of the
Justices provides an intriguing hint as to where the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence may go next.

89. See Goldstein, supra note 86.
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